Iraq WMD, Case for War
What was the case for war? How was it justified?
Sunday, February 08, 2004
Blix Says Bush, Blair Insincere Salesmen on Iraq )
Excite - News: "Blix Says Bush, Blair Insincere Salesmen on Iraq | Feb 8, 2:44 pm ET | By Mike Peacock
LONDON (Reuters) - The former chief U.N. weapons inspector Sunday likened the use of intelligence by the leaders of Britain and the United States to justify war in Iraq to the tactics of insincere salesmen.
Hans Blix -- who pleaded for more time to search Iraq for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons before a U.S.-led invasion in March -- said the West had a right to expect more from their leaders.
'The intention was to dramatize it (the intelligence) just as the vendors of some merchandise are trying to exaggerate the importance of what they have,' Blix told BBC television.
Nearly 10 months after the war none of the biological or chemical weapons cited by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the reason for a pre-emptive attack on Iraq have been found.
'From politicians, our leaders in the Western world, I think we expect more than that, a bit more sincerity,' Blix said."
Excite - News: "Blix Says Bush, Blair Insincere Salesmen on Iraq | Feb 8, 2:44 pm ET | By Mike Peacock
LONDON (Reuters) - The former chief U.N. weapons inspector Sunday likened the use of intelligence by the leaders of Britain and the United States to justify war in Iraq to the tactics of insincere salesmen.
Hans Blix -- who pleaded for more time to search Iraq for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons before a U.S.-led invasion in March -- said the West had a right to expect more from their leaders.
'The intention was to dramatize it (the intelligence) just as the vendors of some merchandise are trying to exaggerate the importance of what they have,' Blix told BBC television.
Nearly 10 months after the war none of the biological or chemical weapons cited by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the reason for a pre-emptive attack on Iraq have been found.
'From politicians, our leaders in the Western world, I think we expect more than that, a bit more sincerity,' Blix said."
Thursday, February 05, 2004
CIA 'never claimed Iraq posed imminent threat'
News: "CIA 'never claimed Iraq posed imminent threat' | AP | 05 February 2004
In his first public defense of prewar intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet has said that US analysts never claimed that Iraq posed an imminent threat
Tenet said analysts had varying opinions on the state of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and those differences were spelled out in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate given to the White House. That report summarized intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs.
Analysts "painted an objective assessment for our policy makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests, " he said in a speech at Georgetown University.
"No one told us what to say or how to say it," Tenet said. ...
News: "CIA 'never claimed Iraq posed imminent threat' | AP | 05 February 2004
In his first public defense of prewar intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet has said that US analysts never claimed that Iraq posed an imminent threat
Tenet said analysts had varying opinions on the state of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and those differences were spelled out in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate given to the White House. That report summarized intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs.
Analysts "painted an objective assessment for our policy makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests, " he said in a speech at Georgetown University.
"No one told us what to say or how to say it," Tenet said. ...
Tuesday, February 03, 2004
Claims in Secretary of State Colin Powell's UN Presentation concerning Iraq: analysis and refutation by Glen Rangwala
Traprock Peace Center: "Claims in Secretary of State Colin Powell's UN Presentation concerning Iraq, 5th Feb 2003 | by Glen Rangwala, Lecturer in Politics at Cambridge University - gr10009@cam.ac.uk
Below, the 44 distinct claims in Secretary Powell's speech of 5 February 2003 are reviewed. The main features of the Powell presentation are as follows:
(a) Secretary Powell makes strong claims about Iraq's retention and development of non-conventional weapons, but the claims that he provides substantive evidence for are either tangential or the evidence is ambiguous.
(b) The recordings only seem to show is that Iraq didn't want its 7 December declaration to be found to be inadequate, not that it was trying to conceal weapons. The two are very different sorts of activities.
(c) Secretary Powell made the claim that Iraq moved its weapons facilities when the inspectors were inside Iraq. If true, this information should have been provided to the inspectors themselves. However, the inspectors have found no evidence of this.
(d) There is a very strong reliance upon Iraqi defectors. This is a notoriously unreliable source, and many of the claims of the same defectors that Powell implictly refers to have since been shown to be inaccurate.
Traprock Peace Center: "Claims in Secretary of State Colin Powell's UN Presentation concerning Iraq, 5th Feb 2003 | by Glen Rangwala, Lecturer in Politics at Cambridge University - gr10009@cam.ac.uk
Below, the 44 distinct claims in Secretary Powell's speech of 5 February 2003 are reviewed. The main features of the Powell presentation are as follows:
(a) Secretary Powell makes strong claims about Iraq's retention and development of non-conventional weapons, but the claims that he provides substantive evidence for are either tangential or the evidence is ambiguous.
(b) The recordings only seem to show is that Iraq didn't want its 7 December declaration to be found to be inadequate, not that it was trying to conceal weapons. The two are very different sorts of activities.
(c) Secretary Powell made the claim that Iraq moved its weapons facilities when the inspectors were inside Iraq. If true, this information should have been provided to the inspectors themselves. However, the inspectors have found no evidence of this.
(d) There is a very strong reliance upon Iraqi defectors. This is a notoriously unreliable source, and many of the claims of the same defectors that Powell implictly refers to have since been shown to be inaccurate.
[Britain's] Blair Calls Iraq WMD Inquiry; Opponents Cry Foul
Excite - News: "Blair Calls Iraq WMD Inquiry; Opponents Cry Foul | Feb 3, 9:19 am ET | By Mike Peacock and Katherine Baldwin
LONDON (Reuters) - Tony Blair bowed to growing pressure Tuesday, calling an inquiry into the quality of British intelligence on banned Iraqi weapons but a key opposition party refused to take part.
The Liberal Democrats said the investigation should examine the political decisions taken to wage war, rather than focus exclusively on problems with information from spies.
Blair refused, sparking criticism that the probe would be too narrowly defined to be meaningful.
'I think it is right...that we have a look at the intelligence that we received and whether it was accurate or not,' Blair told a parliamentary committee. 'We do not in my view need an inquiry into the political decision to go to war.'"
Excite - News: "Blair Calls Iraq WMD Inquiry; Opponents Cry Foul | Feb 3, 9:19 am ET | By Mike Peacock and Katherine Baldwin
LONDON (Reuters) - Tony Blair bowed to growing pressure Tuesday, calling an inquiry into the quality of British intelligence on banned Iraqi weapons but a key opposition party refused to take part.
The Liberal Democrats said the investigation should examine the political decisions taken to wage war, rather than focus exclusively on problems with information from spies.
Blair refused, sparking criticism that the probe would be too narrowly defined to be meaningful.
'I think it is right...that we have a look at the intelligence that we received and whether it was accurate or not,' Blair told a parliamentary committee. 'We do not in my view need an inquiry into the political decision to go to war.'"
